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The Scorpion And The Frog: A False
Narrative Of Human Nature

I<:aren Silverman &Jaret I<:anarek

The Scorpion and the Frog is an age-old fable, having taken various
forms over the past centuries.1 In the story, a scorpion asks a frog to carry
him across a river. The frog is hesitant to agree because the scorpion might
sting him on the trip. The scorpion assures the frog that he would not do
that because it would cause himself to drown. The frog agrees, yet midway
through the trip, the scorpion stings the frog anyway. When the frog asks
the scorpion why, he replies that it is in his nature.
Like all fables, there is a moral to the story that is meant to be ap
plicable to man's life. The moral of The Scorpion and The Frog, as it is gen
erally interpreted, is that there are certain irrepressible instincts that man
is helpless against.
The first problem with this moral is that the story from which it is
derived is not analogous to man's nature. Man is born tabula rasa, meaning
his mind is a blank slate, absent of automatic knowledge. Unlike other ani
mals' man is a volitional being; he is able to make choices that determine
the course of his life. He does not have preset instincts that force him to
react in a specified manner to the given stimulus of the moment. Man is
equipped with organs that receive sensations but he must use his faculty of
reason to apply such vital information to his life. He may have automatic
perceptual level sensations and functions, but his knowledge is not auto
matic. Man achieves knowledge through cognitive reasoning, which acts
as a filter to whatever seemingly innate desires he may experience. He may
feel sensations and emotions whether he wants to or not, but he will always
have the ability to choose whether or not to act on said feelings.
The moral of the story implies that man has innate instincts, but
man does not possess such faculties. Take for instance the most highly cit
ed example of a human instinct, "fight or flight:' In situations of danger, the

There are many versions of this story, but they only differ in the species
of the main characters and not in the main moral and events of the story. Aesop's
version, The Farmer and the Viper is a very famous variant of The Scorpion and

the Frog.
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fight or flight instinct supposedly kicks in forcing someone to either fight
or flee from a perceived threat. For example, an approaching bus seems
to elicit an automatic response in a man to jump out of the way. His heart
starts racing, he starts sweating, his movements and breathing quickens.
This, however, is not sufficient evidence for the existence of innate instincts.
What is critical is to understand why the bus elicits this reaction.
The answer can be found in the fact that all men automatize knowledge
over the course of their life. This automatized knowledge becomes a funda
mental part of his very reasoning, no matter how lightening-quick it may
be. In the case of the rapidly approaching bus, there is a whole range of au
tomatized knowledge that the man implicitly utilizes. In the most abstract,
he must have at least operational knowledge of the natural laws; he must
know that his life is not immutable, that he values his life, and under which
specific conditions his life is threatened. More concretely, he must know
what the bus could do to him should it collide with him, that he will most
likely die, et cetera. His knowledge of all of these facts is what enables him
to identify the bus as a threat to him and choose to move out of the way to
save his life. The fact that these value judgments happen at lightning quick
speeds does not mean that the process does not exist at all. It certainly does
not give reason to believe that his actions were dictated by an inherent na
ture.
Automatized knowledge is not granted to men automatically, how
ever. Knowledge must first be held consciously before it can be automa
tized. Take for example the process of learning to type. When people first
learn to type, they must consciously think about where each key is, which
finger to strike it with, et cetera. In building the knowledge necessary to
type, typing is slow and remains a fully (and painfully) conscious experi
ence. Through enough experience and practice that knowledge eventually
becomes automatized. This same process occurs with learning a language,
learning to walk or play sports, et cetera. On the surface, they all seem to
be almost instinctual once they have become mastered. Just as it would
be foolish to claim that typing is instinctual because of the seemingly un
thinking and quick way in which it is performed, so too would it be to call
instinctual a man jumping out of the way of an oncoming bus.
Concluding the discussion of the oncoming bus, there is one fi
nal element that must be addressed. That is, the presence of the seemingly
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7

The Intellectual Standard

The Scorpion And The Frog

biological reactions such as an elevated heart rate. Such phenomena are
reactions to stimuli, whether perceived or imagined. It is not just the pres
ence of stimuli, but also the fact that they are encompassed by either auto
matic or consciously held value judgments. Fast moving buses alone do not
trigger intense anxiety, nor do objects of any kind moving toward or near
a person. Additionally, happiness, fear, anxiety, and the like, do not float
around in men's minds and bodies striking at random. Man is biologically
built with the capacity of emotion, but what he feels emotions toward and
for, and in what contexts, is a result of his chosen values. In essence, "there
can be no causeless love or any sort of causeless emotion. An emotion is a
response to a fact of reality, an estimate dictated by your standards:'2 Thus,
in the case of the oncoming bus the fact of reality is that a bus is approach
ing a man's body at a fast rate. It is man's evaluation of that bus as a threat to
his life-something he wishes to protect-that causes him to jump out of
the way. When he sees the oncoming bus, his heart rate increases, his palms
sweat, and so on, because he has judged the situation as threatening to his
life, causing him sheer terror and anxiety worthy enough to trigger such a
biological reaction. The same thing occurs when a man sweats, shakes or
stutters when he is nervous, except the bus example demonstrates it as an
incredibly sped up process.
How about the idea of basic survival instincts? There is a good rea
son that we protect babies from the dangers of sharp objects, fire, and pills
that look like candy. They have no concept of these dangers because they
have never had the experience to understand them. One might argue that
babies develop protective instincts later on. However, there is no scientific
or rational reason as to why these instincts kick in later rather than sooner.
Such a notion is to simply equate learning to a matter of waiting for ones
instincts to kick in. There is no science to support these claims, and that is
all they are: claims without warrants.
Those who regard the moral of this story to be analogous to "hu
man nature" are accepting and promoting the idea that man has no control
over his actions. They are accepting the idea that human volition is subor
dinate to innate human instinct. Yet, there is another factor of The Scorpion
and the Frog that needs to be fettered out. In the story, it is not just any type
of arbitrary action being described; it is an action with evil intent. Thus,
2

Ayn Rand, "Galt's Speech:' For the New Intellectual, page 147.
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the deeper message not only makes a claim about man's nature, but places
a value judgment on the very nature it describes. That is, it is not just any
nature but an inherently evil nature that he cannot control.
Such a proposition is the secular equivalent of Original Sin, which
holds man is inherently sinful by the very fact that he is born as man. In
other words, he is guilty by his nature. To accept such a notion has dan
gerous consequences. Man's volitional nature is readily discarded, exclud
ing choice and therefore free will. The epistemic consequences upon any
rational man who truly accepts the notion that his life is out of his control
are fairly obvious. To say the least, he will feel a constant sense of power
lessness and inefficacy in the world around him. At worst, he may take the
viewpoint to its logical extreme; acting however he pleases under the guise
that he "just couldn' t help if'
Many political philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, Niccolo
Machiavelli, Ayn Rand, and the founding fathers, recognized either ex
plicitly or implicitly the deep relationship between man's nature and his
governing structures. In the view at hand, man is guilty for merely exist
ing' and as such, the ground is readily laid for the most intrusive forms of
preventive law. If man is laden with irrepressible and irresponsible aspects
of his nature that requires him to do bad things, then the question is not if
he will act on his nature but when. This is a simplified version of preventive
law's justification, and with it there is surely an undesirable political result
to follow, at least for those who desire the protection of their individual
rights. As Ayn Rand put it, "the legal hallmark of a dictatorship [is] preven
tative law-the concept that man is guilty until he is proved innocent by
the permissive rubber stamp of a commissar or a Gauleiter:'3
Perhaps the true moral of this tale is that unlike the scorpion, man
is not like the rest of the animal kingdom-he is the rational animal and
has free will. The excuse, "It's in my nature, I couldn' t help it" is not a valid
one. It is time to drop the notion of innately ordained behavior and instead
make rational choices based on the facts of reality. We can and do choose,
and we are responsible for our actions.

3

"Who Will Protect Us From Our Protectors?" The Objectivist Newsletter,

May 1962, page 20.
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